Being And Time: Rebuilding

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Heidegger explains in section 7 how he is going to rebuild the ontology of being using the tools of the phenomenological method. Heidegger studied under Edmund Husserl who developed the method in order to observe the phenomena as they appeared in consciousness. Heidegger defines “phenomenon” as “what shows itself in itself, what is manifest” (29). From this he offers a definition of phenomenology:

“Phenomenology means: ἀποφαίνεσθαι τα φαινόμενα– to let what shows itself be seen from itself, just as it shows itself from itself. That is the formal meaning of the type of research that calls itself ‘phenomenology.’ But this expresses nothing other than the maxim formulated above: “To the things themselves!” (34)

The Greek expression above is transliterated as “apophainesthai ta phainomena” which means “explanation of phenomena” or as Heidegger puts it “to let what shows itself be seen from itself.”

In philosophy, a phenomenon is an observable event or object. The phenomenological method allows an observer to look at subjective experiences in order to build a description of what is seen. For Heidegger this method means much more than just looking at something and saying, “it is round, soft, and it looks to be red in color.” He is going to plumb deeper depths in order to see the structures of the phenomenon’s being.

The phenomenological method might be disorienting for those of us coming from the analytic tradition. At times it looks like Heidegger is pulling things out of thin air. This is captured perfectly by Bertrand Russell when he wrote:

“Highly eccentric in its terminology, [Heidegger’s] philosophy is extremely obscure. One cannot help suspecting that language is here running riot. An interesting point in his speculations is the insistence that nothingness is something positive. As with much else in existentialism, this is a psychological observation made to pass for logic” (Russell, p. 303).

In his early lectures, Heidegger denies that he is doing psychology or logic. He asserts that his findings are drawn from self-articulating entities. “Nothing is read into the matters… instead everything is drawn from them” (HCT, 302).

Heidegger looks at “the matters themselves” for the sake of having those things reveal their being to him. This approach must be understood or else the book makes little sense. Whether you believe him or not is another matter of course. In any case, my task here is merely to outline what Heidegger discovered for himself during his investigations. I’ll save any critical remarks for the end.

I need to say a few words about hermeneutics (from the Greek word for interpretation). Along with the phenomenological method this is another tool in Heidegger’s toolbox. What Heidegger will do is start with an initial understanding, examine it, reach a new understanding, and then use that new understanding to go deeper into a new context. If it feels sometimes when reading the book that Heidegger is going around in circles, it’s because he is. After Heidegger, we now call this the hermeneutic circle. It’s an admission that, like a merry-go-round, there is no starting point. Interpretation has to begin somewhere so you just hop on and grab the first horse you see.  As Heidegger describes it, “our attempt must aim at leaping into this ‘circle’ primordially and completely, so that even at the beginning of our analysis… we make sure that we have a complete view” (316).

Heidegger asserts that we can’t just observe things in a casual way. Like the earlier example with the candle, beings can be hidden (absent) and must be disclosed. This is why Heidegger argues that a naive “first glance” approach to phenomenology, where the observer does little more than report the surface properties of an object, will not get at deeper meanings. Heidegger is going to take a more active role in his project and interpret what he’s observing in order to reveal what is hidden:

“The way of encountering being and the structures of being in the mode of phenomenon must first be wrested from the objects of phenomenology. Thus, the point of departure of the analysis, the access to the phenomenon, and passage through the prevalent coverings must secure their own method. The idea of an ‘originary’ and ‘intuitive’ grasp and explication of phenomena must be opposed to the naivete of an accidental, ‘immediate’ and unreflective ‘beholding'” (37).

This is a good time to introduce a few more technical terms. Heidegger will refer to ontic and ontological being. Ontic refers to a particular entity, object, or person. This is the domain of science. Ontological refers to being in general. This is the domain of metaphysics, and it is what interests Heidegger most. The term primordial [ursprünglich] means an aspect of being that is more original or ontological and goes deeper than mere surface descriptions of a particular being.

For example, suppose I hold in my hand a red ball and begin to describe it to you. This is an ontic description of a particular entity as it appears to me. However, suppose I’m empty-handed but I say to you “a ball must be round, or it isn’t a ball.” Now I’m not talking about a particular red ball. I’m talking about what it means to be a ball. This is an ontological statement. Heidegger believes that ontological descriptions of being are more original or “primordial” than ontic descriptions.

Heidegger is going to use both the phenomenological method and hermeneutics to slowly but surely arrive at (and evolve) his conclusions over the course of the book. The place he begins is with us. “The being whose analysis our task is, is always we ourselves” (42). That is the subject of the next blog post.

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